Meaning is a concept used in psychology as well as in other fields such as philosophy, linguistics, semiotics and sociology. These multidisciplinary use of the term are not independent, but more or less overlapping. Within each of these fields there are different ways in which the term meaning is constructed and used and each of these constructions may match related constructions in other fields. At the deepest level are each construction associated with an epistemological position. The concept "meaning" is thus used differently in different epistemological traditions in each field. The logical positivists, for example, associated meaning with scientific verification.[1] The meaning of meaning is therefore understood differently in different schools of psychology (as well as in different schools of linguistics etc).
Behaviorism[2]
Cognitive psychology Jerome Bruner, one of the founding fathers of cognitive psychology wrote: "Very early on, ... emphasis began shifting from 'meaning' to 'information', from the construction of meaning to the processing of information. These are profoundly different matters. The key factor in the shift was the introduction of computation as the ruling metaphor and of computability as a necessary criterion of a good theoretical model. Information is indifferent with respect to meaning... (Bruner, 1990, p. 4).[3]
"German critical psychology provides a metatheoretical framework for research on both psychological and computational tasks. One important part of this is the logical-historical development of the meaning category. It is shown that meaning is nothing absolute but objective. Meaning is neither a property of things nor only present as an imagination of cognition. Thus, meanings cannot be "defined" or "assigned" as commonly thought. Meanings arise from societal production of use-value." (Meretz, 1999, p. 126)[4]
A similar understanding developed in Cultural Studies of Science: "Cultural studies thereby articulate dynamic, expressive conceptions of meaning, knowledge, and power, which contrast sharply with the standard approaches to these phenomena within philosophy and social theory (Rouse 1996,[5] 1999.[6] ). On such accounts, meaning is not a property of utterances or actions; the term `meaning' instead articulates the ways in which such performances inferentially draw upon and transform the field of prior performances in which they are situated." (Rouse, 2001, p. 3126)[7]
Sinha, C. (1988). Language and Representation. A socio-naturalistic approach to human development. New York: Harvester.